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NOTES 
 
Treating Section 303(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code as Subject-Matter 
Jurisdictional 
SOUND APPROACH OR INVOLUNTARY REFLEX? 
INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy is typically thought of as a “last resort,”1 a 
process by which debtors can obtain relief from unmanageable 
debt2 and escape the incessant and distressing collection 
attempts of creditors.3 Given this characterization of 
bankruptcy as “relief,”4 it is not surprising that the vast 
majority of bankruptcy cases are initiated by debtors, who 
voluntarily accept the downsides of bankruptcy in exchange for 
  
 1 “Almost all who file for bankruptcy do so as a last resort . . . .” 151 CONG. 
REC. E753, E754 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2005) (statement of Rep. McCollum). But see 151 
CONG. REC. S2405, S2474 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“For many 
people, bankruptcy has become a first step rather than a last resort.”); DAVID A. SKEEL 
JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY of BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 1 (2001) 
(“[I]ndividuals and businesses in the United States do not seem to view bankruptcy as 
the absolute last resort . . . .”).  
 2 See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (One purpose of 
bankruptcy is “to give the bankrupt a fresh start.”); In re Chalasani, 92 F.3d 1300, 1304 
(2d Cir. 1996) (“[O]ne of the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy Code [is] allowing 
the debtor to begin a new life free from debt . . . .”). 
 3 See In re Meyers, 344 B.R. 61, 66-67 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (“One 
significant remedial purpose of a bankruptcy discharge order is to prevent the 
emotionally harmful conduct associated with debt collection tactics.”); In re Gervin, 337 
B.R. 854, 863 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (“A significant component of [bankruptcy] is 
being free of the kinds of harassment, threats, and anxiety that debtors were suffering 
before they filed.”).  
 4 See, e.g., Charles G. Hallinan, The ‘Fresh Start’ Policy in Consumer 
Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 
51 (1986) (“The central importance of debtor relief in consumer bankruptcies is a 
commonplace of legal discussion.”). 
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freedom from crushing financial obligations.5 In fact, in most 
consumer bankruptcies, creditors have little incentive to see 
their debtors file for bankruptcy, since there are usually no 
assets left to distribute after state and federal exemptions are 
applied to the debtor’s estate.6 The United States Bankruptcy 
Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) does, however, provide a means 
for creditors to force unwilling debtors into bankruptcy,7 a 
potentially appealing option for a creditor who fears that the 
debtor’s existing nonexempt assets will have been squandered 
by the time the debtor finally files a voluntary bankruptcy 
petition.8  
As might be expected, however, a creditor cannot push 
an unwilling debtor into bankruptcy with the relative ease with 
which a debtor can do so to itself. Instead, Section 303(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code provides a number of requirements9 that 
  
 5 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 303.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 15th ed. 2002); see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-110, at 2 & n.9 (2003) (“[F]ewer than 1 
percent of all bankruptcy case filings are commenced involuntarily.”); Richard M. 
Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1, 9 n.43 (2008) (“Involuntary cases are very rare.”).  
 6 Ed Flynn, Gordon Bermant, & Suzanne Hazard, Bankruptcy by the 
Numbers: Chapter 7 Asset Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 22 
(“About 96 percent of chapter 7 cases are closed without any funds collected and 
distributed to creditors . . . .”); SKEEL, supra note 1, at 8 (“Although creditors can push 
a debtor into bankruptcy by filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition, they have little 
incentive to do so.”). 
 7 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). 
 8 See, e.g., Evan D. Flaschen & Carrie A. Brodzinski, Involuntary Petitions 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 547 PLI/COMM 93, 97-98 (1990) (detailing several 
situations that might prompt a creditor to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition); 
H.R. REP. NO. 108-110, at 2 (“[A]n involuntary bankruptcy petition can serve as a 
useful creditor collection tool. For example, it can preserve assets from further 
dissipation and provide for their orderly liquidation by a bankruptcy trustee, a 
fiduciary charged by statute to protect such assets and maximize their value for the 
benefit of creditors.”); COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 303.01 (“[T]here are certain key 
situations in which the filing of an involuntary case remains a beneficial, and 
sometimes optimal, choice for creditors . . . .”); In re All Media Props., Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 
134 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980) (“[I]t is important that involuntary petitions be tried and 
resolved promptly because if the debtor is not paying its debts as they become due, 
then its creditors are entitled to the protection of their rights afforded by the Code and 
to prevent the debtor from wasting its assets.”).  
 9 11 U.S.C. § 303(b). This provision provides in relevant part: 
An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the 
bankruptcy court of a petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title— 
(1) by three or more entities, each of which is . . . a holder of a claim against 
such person that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide 
dispute as to liability or amount . . . if such noncontingent, undisputed claims 
aggregate at least [$13,475] more than the value of any lien on property of 
the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of such claims; [or] 
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must be met in order for relief to be entered in an involuntary 
bankruptcy proceeding.10 The majority of courts and 
commentators have interpreted these requirements as prima 
facie elements of an involuntary bankruptcy case, which must 
be either disputed or waived by the debtor.11 However, in In re 
BDC 56,12 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals joined the 
minority of jurisdictions and interpreted certain of these 
requirements as being subject-matter jurisdictional in nature,13 
meaning that they pertain to “the courts’ statutory or 
constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”14 The Second 
Circuit based its position on the argument that creditors 
should be forced to prove the sufficiency of the involuntary 
petition “at the earliest practicable point.”15 This Note argues 
that the Second Circuit’s treatment of the Section 303(b) 
requirements as subject-matter jurisdictional is contradictory 
to the provision’s implied goals of fairness and judicial 
efficiency, and is inconsistent with the jurisdictional structure 
of the United States bankruptcy system.  
Part I of this Note surveys the history of the 
Bankruptcy Code, focusing on the origins and development of 
federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. It details the 
jurisdictional structure of the bankruptcy system, laying a 
  
(2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders . . . by one or more of such holders 
that hold in the aggregate at least $10,000 of such claims . . . . 
Id.  
 10 Note that in the context of an involuntary bankruptcy, a debtor who 
opposes the petition is seeking dismissal rather than relief. See In re Alta Title Co., 55 
B.R. 133, 135-36 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (“An involuntary petition must end either in 
the entry of an order for relief against the debtor or dismissal of the creditors’ 
petition.”).  
 11 See, e.g., In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1101 
(11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases and authority supporting this proposition), overruled 
by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 12 In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 13 Id. at 118. In fact, although the Second Circuit shares its position with a 
small number of bankruptcy courts in other circuits, it is the only circuit court to have 
explicitly adopted this holding. See, e.g., In re Paczesny, 283 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2002) (“The absence of a bona fide dispute [as required by § 303(b)] is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite.”); In re New Mexico Props., Inc., 18 B.R. 936, 939-40 
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (describing § 303(b) as a “[jurisdictional] hurdle for petitioning 
creditors to overcome”). The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits are the only other circuits to 
have explicitly ruled on this issue, both concluding that § 303(b) is not subject-matter 
jurisdictional in nature. In re Trusted Net Media, 550 F.3d at 1046; In re Rubin, 769 
F.2d 611, 615 (9th Cir. 1985).  
 14 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); see infra 
Part III.A.1 (describing the basic principles of subject matter jurisdiction).  
 15 In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d at 118. 
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foundation for the argument that the Section 303(b) 
requirements do not pertain to the bankruptcy courts’ 
jurisdiction. Part II investigates the Section 303(b) circuit split, 
examining three cases in which courts have justified their 
treatment of the Section 303(b) requirements either as subject-
matter jurisdictional or as “substantive matters which must be 
proved or waived for petitioning creditors to prevail in 
involuntary proceedings.”16 Part III assesses the various 
rationales for, and implications of, both sides of the circuit split 
and contends that the Second Circuit’s approach to the Section 
303(b) requirements is inconsistent with the jurisdictional 
structure of the Bankruptcy Code, wastes judicial resources, 
and therefore should be abandoned. This section highlights two 
recent cases, one from the United States Supreme Court17 and 
another from the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of 
New York,18 both of which cast doubt on the Second Circuit’s 
treatment of Section 303(b) as subject-matter jurisdictional and 
indicate that BDC should no longer be upheld as good law. This 
Note concludes that the Second Circuit should resolve the 
circuit split in favor of treating Section 303(b) as substantive, 
and not subject-matter jurisdictional, in nature.  
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN BANKRUPTCY CODE 
In order to appreciate the merits and weaknesses of the 
arguments on either side of the Section 303(b) circuit split, it is 
first necessary to understand the overall structure of the 
Bankruptcy Code, including the role of involuntary bankruptcy 
proceedings and the rationale behind the modern jurisdictional 
structure of the U.S. bankruptcy system. Involuntary 
bankruptcy cases, though far less common today than they 
were at the inception of our nation’s bankruptcy laws,19 were 
always within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.20 While 
  
 16 In re Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 n.3.  
 17 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 18 In re MarketXT Holdings Corp., 347 B.R. 156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 19 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 8 (“Under current law, the vast majority of debtors 
file for bankruptcy voluntarily . . . . In the nineteenth century, by contrast, involuntary 
bankruptcy figured quite prominently.”); supra note 5 (discussing infrequency of 
involuntary bankruptcy petitions today). 
 20 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 27 (“By 1867, it was evident that Congress could 
enact both voluntary and involuntary laws . . . [which] were administered through the 
federal district courts.”); David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical 
Analysis of Insolvency Laws and Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction of 
Today’s United States Bankruptcy Court and its Judicial Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. & 
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the jurisdictional structure of bankruptcy courts is quite 
different today, its evolution has been shaped by the desire to 
make the bankruptcy process as fair, efficient, and cost-
effective as possible.21 In order to further these objectives, 
Section 303(b) must be interpreted as substantive rather than 
jurisdictional because this approach better comports with the 
statutory structure of the bankruptcy system, creates greater 
predictability, and leads to more efficient resolution of 
bankruptcy cases. 
A. Involuntary Bankruptcy and the Roots of Modern U.S. 
Bankruptcy Law 
The English bankruptcy laws, from which our modern 
bankruptcy system evolved, were in fact remarkably different 
from the scheme that the United States has in place today.22 
Most notably, the first English bankruptcy statutes, enacted 
under Henry VIII in 1582, treated the debtor as a criminal, did 
not release the debtor from debts remaining after liquidation 
and distribution, and could only be invoked on the initiative of 
the creditors.23 Although later versions of English bankruptcy 
law decriminalized the proceedings and provided for discharge 
of unsatisfied obligations,24 the process remained one that was 
commenced by creditors against potentially unwilling debtors.25 
In other words, the only bankruptcy proceeding available was 
involuntary.26  
With little debate or fanfare, the Founding Fathers 
granted to Congress the constitutional power to pass 
bankruptcy laws.27 When Congress passed the first federal 
  
PRAC. 165, 170-71 (2000) (the first Bankruptcy Act of the United States provided for 
only involuntary bankruptcy cases, and gave district courts jurisdiction to appoint 
“non-judicial, bankruptcy ‘commissioners’ to assist in administering proceedings under 
this Act”). 
 21 The goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to “secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.  
 22 Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”: What Does 
That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 281-82 (explaining that “American social, economic, 
and philosophical influences modified English tradition to create American bankruptcy 
law”).  
 23 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 169. 
 24 Id. at 169-70.  
 25 See id. at 169-70.  
 26 Id. at 169. 
 27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to pass “uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies”); Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: 
Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 608 
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bankruptcy statute in 1800, it adopted the creditor-friendly 
involuntary approach used in England.28 However, the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was soon repealed and it was not until 
two more failed attempts by Congress that a workable 
bankruptcy system emerged in 1898.29 The intervening years 
witnessed a continuous struggle between debtors and creditors 
to shape the law in their respective favor.30 But by 1898, it 
became evident that debtors had definitively won the battle for 
voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, which first appeared in the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 and have remained a fixture of United 
States bankruptcy law ever since.31 Nevertheless, the 1898 
Bankruptcy Act still included provisions for involuntary 
bankruptcy petitions,32 which remain substantially unchanged 
to this day.33 
  
(2008) (this constitutional provision was drafted “with surprisingly little debate”); 
SKEEL, supra note 1, at 23 (the provision was included “almost as an afterthought . . . 
and it was approved with little debate”). 
 28 SKEEL, supra note 1, at 25; Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 170-71.  
 29 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 171-75 (“[The 1898] Act formed the 
basis of our modern bankruptcy laws.”).  
 30 DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE 
RISK MANAGER 136-37 (2004); Krieger, supra note 22, at 293 (“Until the middle of the 
nineteenth century, bankruptcy law was decidedly pro-creditor. Since then it has 
oscillated between provisions favoring debtors and those favoring creditors, depending 
on economic and political pressures at a given time.”). 
 31 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 171-75; MOSS, supra note 30, at 136-38.  
 32 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 59, 30 Stat. 544, 561-62 (1898) (repealed 
1978). The provision governing involuntary cases under this Act stated: 
[t]hree or more creditors who have provable claims against any person which 
amount in the aggregate, in excess of the value of securities held by them, if 
any, to five hundred dollars or over; or if all of the creditors of such persons 
are less than twelve in number, then one of such creditors whose claim equals 
such amount may file a petition to have him adjudged a bankrupt. . . . If it be 
averred in the petition that the creditors of the bankrupt are less than twelve 
in number, and less than three creditors have joined as petitioners therein, 
and the answer avers the existence of a larger number of creditors, there 
shall be filed with the answer a list under oath of all the creditors, with their 
addresses, and thereupon the court shall cause all such creditors to be 
notified of the pendency of such petition and shall delay the hearing upon 
such petition for a reasonable time, to the end that parties in interest shall 
have an opportunity to be heard . . . . 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 59(b), (d).  
 33 Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 59(b) (requirements for creditors to file 
an involuntary bankruptcy petition), with 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), (c) (2006), and FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 1003(b) (same).  
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B. Development of the Present-Day Jurisdictional Structure 
of the Bankruptcy Code 
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act remained in place until the 
passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, which was enacted after 
lengthy studies by both the Brookings Institution34 and the 
congressionally established Commission on the Bankruptcy 
Laws of the United States.35 By 1970, it had become apparent 
that in addition to being outdated in a variety of respects, the 
1898 Act caused confusion and inefficiency in bankruptcy suits 
because of serious jurisdictional deficiencies.36 In particular, 
bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the 1898 Act was limited 
to the bankruptcy proceeding itself plus a narrow class of 
controversies that arose during the course of the bankruptcy 
proceeding.37 All other disputes that arose during the case had 
to be litigated separately in either state or federal district 
court.38 The resulting “bifurcated jurisdiction” led to great 
expense and delay due to both the “threshold jurisdictional 
litigation” as well as the practical inconvenience of litigating in 
multiple forums.39 The 1978 Bankruptcy Code sought to remedy 
  
 34 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 177. “The Brookings Institution is a 
nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, D.C. . . [whose] mission is to 
conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide 
innovative, practical recommendations [to] [s]trengthen American democracy; [f]oster 
the economic and social welfare, security and opportunity of all Americans and [s]ecure 
a more open, safe, prosperous and cooperative international system.” Brookings 
Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/about.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).  
 35 Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for 
Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 638 (2002) (“Congress established [the 
Commission] in 1970 . . . to ‘study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes’ in the 
Bankruptcy Act. The ensuing report and hearings ultimately led to the passage of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.”) (footnote omitted) (quoting COMM’N ON THE 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. 
DOC. NO. 137 93d Cong., 1st Sess., part I, at 1-2 (1973)); Kennedy & Clift, supra note 
20, at 177. 
 36 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 177, 188. The term “jurisdiction” in this 
discussion, and in this Note generally, relates to subject matter jurisdiction rather than 
personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is relatively easy to obtain in bankruptcy 
proceedings, at least where the defendant is located in the United States, because the 
bankruptcy courts can effect nationwide service of process. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004; 
Leonard Gerson, Class Proofs of Claim and Class Actions in Bankruptcy: Clarifying the 
Law, Improving the Process, and Expanding the Use of Class Actions, 17 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 6 Art. 2, at n.208 (“[C]ourts . . . have determined that the minimum contacts 
required for a bankruptcy court to have personal jurisdiction over an entity is satisfied 
by the entity’s presence in the U.S. as a whole rather than in any particular state.”).  
 37 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 187.  
 38 Id. at 187-88. 
 39 Id. at 188; Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy 
Jurisdiction: A General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
743, 792 (2000) (“The primary vice of the 1898 Act’s jurisdictional regime was that it 
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this shortcoming by granting expansive subject matter 
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts.40 Thus, the Code created 
independent bankruptcy courts that were instructed to exercise 
“original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11” 
and “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to 
cases under title 11.”41  
Within four years, however, this broad jurisdictional 
grant to bankruptcy courts failed a constitutional challenge in 
the United States Supreme Court.42 In 1982, the Supreme 
Court in Northern Pipeline Construction v. Marathon Pipeline 
Company held that the jurisdictional grant of the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code was unconstitutional because it allowed non-
Article III judges43 to adjudicate matters governed by state law 
that were merely “related to” a bankruptcy case.44 Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion explained that Article III of the 
United States Constitution was designed to ensure the 
separation of powers and to protect the independence of the 
judiciary.45 While Congress has the authority to assign certain 
judicial functions to non-Article III “adjunct tribunals,”46 the 
  
engendered an excessive amount of preliminary litigation over jurisdictional issues 
surrounding the bifurcation of bankruptcy jurisdiction.”). 
 40 Brubaker, supra note 39, at 791; Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 188; 
see also In re Hospitality Ventures/LaVista, 358 B.R. 462, 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007) 
(“One of [the] primary objectives [of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978] was to expand 
bankruptcy jurisdiction and eliminate disputes over what bankruptcy judges could 
hear in order to avoid costly and time-consuming arguments over jurisdiction.”). 
 41 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 1471 (Supp. III 1980).  
 42 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
50 (1982). 
 43 Id. at 61 (“[T]here is no doubt that the bankruptcy judges created by the 
[1978] Act are not Art. III judges.”). 
 44 Id. at 88; 1 HON. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, III, 
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:24 (3d ed. 2009); THOMAS J. SALERNO & 
JORDAN A. KROOP, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION AND PRACTICE § 3.05 (2006) (“The 
Supreme Court’s principal concern was that bankruptcy judges, who were appointed 
for fixed terms and had salaries subject to reduction by Congress, had jurisdiction 
under the law to hear and decide all matters, even those based solely on state law and 
having only a tangential nexus to the bankruptcy estate.”).  
 45 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57-60. The bulk of this protection comes 
from the fact that Art. III judges are given life-tenure and guaranteed a non-
diminishing salary, thus ensuring that concerns about their compensation do not color 
their judgment. Id. at 59; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Under the 1978 Act, bankruptcy 
judges served only 14-year terms, they were subject to removal for “incompetency, 
misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability,” 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1978), 
and were not provided a guaranteed salary. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53. 
 46 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77, 80-82. “The [1978] Act designate[d] the 
bankruptcy court in each district as an ‘adjunct’ to the district court.” Id. at 63 n.13 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976)).  
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1978 Act vested bankruptcy judges with all the “‘essential 
attributes’ of the judicial power of the United States.”47 Finding 
that this broad jurisdictional grant exceeded “Congress’ power 
to create adjuncts to Art. III courts,” a plurality of the Court 
held that the jurisdictional provision of the 1978 Act was 
unconstitutional.48 
In order to keep the bankruptcy system afloat, the 
federal courts adopted the “Emergency Rule,” which was 
effectively a return to bifurcated jurisdiction.49 When Congress 
finally passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, it essentially maintained this bifurcated 
approach.50 Under the act, Congress granted jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy proceedings to the federal district courts via 28 
U.S.C. § 1334.51 It also designated bankruptcy courts as “unit[s] 
of the district court[s]”52 and authorized district courts to refer 
Title 11 cases to the bankruptcy court in their judicial districts 
via 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).53 As a result of the 1984 Code’s 
demarcation between “core” and “non-core” (or “related to”) 
proceedings,54 an approach that was adopted in order to 
implement the lessons learned in Marathon Pipeline, 
bifurcated jurisdiction became entrenched.55 Core proceedings 
are those matters having a sufficiently close nexus to the 
pending bankruptcy so as to make final determination by the 
bankruptcy court proper.56 Non-core matters, on the other hand, 
cannot be finally determined by the bankruptcy court without 
the consent of the affected parties.57 Without such consent, the 
bankruptcy court can only make a recommendation, which 
  
 47 Id. at 84-85. 
 48 Id. at 87. 
 49 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 189-90. 
 50 Id. at 190-91 (“Broadly and briefly stated, another bifurcated jurisdictional 
approach was adopted by Congress in the 1984 amendments.”). 
 51 The statute provides in relevant part that “the district courts shall have 
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) 
(1982).  
 52 Id. § 151.  
 53 This provision states that “[e]ach district court may provide that any or all 
cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or 
related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the 
district.” Id. § 157(a).  
 54 Id. § 157; Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 191-92; 1 NORTON & NORTON, 
supra note 44, at §§ 4:10 & 4:28.  
 55 Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 180, 191. 
 56 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 4:28 (“A nonexhaustive listing of 
‘core’ proceedings is set forth in 28 [U.S.C.] § 157(b)(2).”).  
 57 Id.  
874 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:3 
must go up to the district court for entry of a final order.58 
Moreover, Congress mandated that, upon timely motion of a 
party, federal courts must abstain from hearing a state law 
claim that could not have otherwise been commenced in the 
federal court had it not been introduced in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.59 This jurisdictional structure has been preserved 
through subsequent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and 
is still in effect today.60  
While numerous disputes as to the proper scope of 
bankruptcy jurisdiction remain,61 two observations emerge that 
are relevant to the analysis of Section 303(b). First, the 
Bankruptcy Code is divided, both conceptually and 
organizationally, into separate substantive and jurisdictional 
sections, with the substantive sections establishing the various 
types of bankruptcy cases available62 and the jurisdictional 
provisions granting district courts and bankruptcy courts the 
authority to hear those cases.63 It has never been doubted that 
involuntary bankruptcy cases, like any other bankruptcy 
proceeding, are “cases under title 11” for the purposes of 
Congress’ grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the bankruptcy 
courts.64 Thus, to the extent that the provisions of Title 11 are 
  
 58 Id. 
 59 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(c)(2), 157 (2006); SALERNO & KROOP, supra note 44, at 
§ 3.10[B].  
 60 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 4:10.  
 61 See, e.g., Jackie Gardina, The Bankruptcy of Due Process: Nationwide 
Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction and the Bankruptcy Code, 16 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 37, 54 & n.85 (2008) (pointing out disagreement between circuit courts as 
to whether a bankruptcy court may retain “their ‘related to’ jurisdiction . . . after the 
bankruptcy has been dismissed”); Radha A. Pathak, Breaking the “Unbreakable Rule”: 
Federal Court, Article I, and the Problem of “Related To” Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 85 
OR. L. REV. 59, 61 (2006) (“The United States Supreme Court appears to have accepted 
the constitutionality of ‘related to’ bankruptcy jurisdiction, but it has never explicitly 
articulated the constitutional basis for such jurisdiction.”); 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra 
note 44, at § 4:63 (identifying “split of authority on whether a particular type of 
proceeding is ‘core’ or ‘related to’” the bankruptcy case).  
 62 The substantive provisions reside in Title 11. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. Ch. 7 
(concerning liquidation cases); 11 U.S.C. Ch. 11 (concerning reorganization cases); 11 
U.S.C. Ch. 13 (concerning adjustment cases). 
 63 The jurisdictional provisions reside in Title 28. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 
1334. 
 64 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 1334; see also In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 
550 F.3d 1035, 1044 (11th Cir. 2008) (“As a class of cases, involuntary bankruptcy 
cases unquestionably arise under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code), and thus fall within 
the congressional grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts.”); In re 
Bowshier, 313 B.R. 232, 238 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004) (“There is no dispute that 
bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.”).  
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construed as substantive in nature, Section 303 should be 
similarly interpreted.65  
Second, while bankruptcy jurisdiction is notoriously 
complex,66 this complexity stems more from the constitutional 
uncertainty surrounding the broad congressional grant of 
jurisdiction to non-Article III judges67 than from any significant 
disagreement as to the finer contours of bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction. The area of greatest uncertainty in the context of 
this jurisdiction relates to the bankruptcy courts’ ability to 
entertain cases and proceedings other than the bankruptcy 
case itself.68 While this issue is just as likely to arise in the 
context of an involuntary bankruptcy as in a debtor-initiated 
bankruptcy, the issue of whether Section 303(b) relates to 
subject matter jurisdiction is largely unrelated to this 
particular area of uncertainty. Rather, it has more to do with 
general notions of subject matter jurisdiction and statutory 
construction. Consequently, despite falling within the broader 
and more complex realm of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, the 
question of how to best interpret Section 303(b) can be 
addressed using the same rules of statutory analysis as are 
used in other contexts. 
II. THREE CASES ADDRESSING THE SECTION 303(b) 
REQUIREMENTS 
Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that an 
involuntary petition be brought by creditors holding claims 
that “aggregate at least [$13,475]”69 and that are “not 
contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as 
  
 65 An involuntary bankruptcy does not, in fact, arise under its own distinct 
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, but rather is a bankruptcy case of the type established 
by 11 U.S.C. Ch. 7 or 11 U.S.C. Ch. 11. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (“An involuntary case may be 
commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title . . . .”). Thus, § 303 is best viewed as 
supplementing those substantive provisions that establish liquidation and 
reorganization cases, so as to allow for their commencement by a creditor as opposed to 
the debtor.  
 66 See, e.g., Brubaker, supra note 39, at 746 (“[T]he jurisdiction in bankruptcy 
remains one of the most enduring puzzles of our federal court system.”); Lipson, supra 
note 27, at 645 (“At least as a conceptual matter, bankruptcy jurisdiction is 
exceedingly—perhaps needlessly—complex . . . .”). 
 67 See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 27, at 645-46. 
 68 See supra note 61. 
 69 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2006). This amount was increased from $5,000 to 
$10,000 in 1994, and the Bankruptcy Code requires that as of 1998, automatic 
adjustments take place every three years. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-
394, § 108(b)(1) (Oct. 22, 1994); 11 U.S.C. § 104; 2 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, 
at § 22:7. 
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to liability or amount.”70 Moreover, if the debtor has more than 
twelve creditors, the petition cannot be brought by fewer than 
three of those creditors.71 Few courts have bothered to perform 
a rigorous analysis of how to best characterize the Section 
303(b) requirements, either because the procedural postures of 
the involuntary cases before them have not required it,72 or 
because they simply chose to apply a precedent that mandated 
a particular conclusion.73 Nevertheless, those courts that have 
addressed this issue have reached conflicting results, with the 
overwhelming majority of them finding that the Section 303(b) 
requirements are not subject-matter jurisdictional but rather 
substantive, as recently held by the Eleventh Circuit in In re 
  
 70 11 U.S.C. § 303(b). The noncontingency requirement prevents claim-
holders from being counted toward the requisite number of petitioning creditors if their 
claims are dependent on the occurrence of a future uncertain event, such as “the 
liability of a guarantor when the principal has not defaulted.” 2 NORTON & NORTON, 
supra note 44, at § 22:3. The undisputed claim requirement is meant to keep creditors 
from forcing a debtor into bankruptcy when there is a “legitimate disagreement over 
whether money is owed, or, in certain cases, how much.” In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 
277 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004). It “prevent[s] creditors from using the bankruptcy 
courts as a club in collecting claims that [are] disputed, although not contingent.” 2 
NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 22:3. Although the phrase “bona fide dispute” is 
not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, the circuit courts have defined it as “an objective 
basis for either a factual or a legal dispute as to the validity of the debt.” In re Byrd, 
357 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Matter of Busick, 831 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 
1987)). “The bankruptcy court need not resolve the merits of the bona fide dispute, but 
simply determine whether one exists.” Id.(citation omitted).  
 71 11 U.S.C. § 303(b). 
 72 An involuntary bankruptcy petition is often “timely controverted” by the 
debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 303(h), in which case the characterization of § 303(b) as substantive 
or jurisdictional loses its significance because there is no longer any question of the 
debtor’s possible waiver of the § 303(b) requirements as a defense. See, e.g., In re Reg’l 
Anesthesia Assocs. PC, 360 B.R. 466, 470 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007) (dismissing 
involuntary petition due to “bona fide dispute” after debtor timely controverted the 
petition); In re Euro-American Lodging Corp., 357 B.R. 700, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(ordering relief against involuntary debtor who filed a timely answer because 
petitioning creditor adequately demonstrated that the petition satisfied the § 303(b) 
requirements).  
 73 See, e.g., In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1101 n.5 
(11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases in which courts concluded that § 303(b) is subject-
matter jurisdictional without providing an explanation of why they did so), overruled 
by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc); In re Quality Laser Works, 211 B.R. 936, 
941 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (stating simply that “[i]t is well settled that the filing of an 
involuntary petition invokes the subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court if 
the petition is sufficient on its face and contains the essential allegations”); In re Taylor 
& Assocs., L.P., 191 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (citing precedent from 
other bankruptcy courts and secondary authorities to conclude that “Courts have long 
recognized that the elements of Bankruptcy Code 303(b) are not prerequisites to 
establishing a bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction over proceedings arising 
from an involuntary petition”). 
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Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC.74 This part summarizes 
three cases in which courts have provided rationales for their 
differing conclusions. First, it looks at In re Rubin,75 in which 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Section 303(b) is not 
jurisdictional. Next, it presents In re BDC 56 LLC,76 in which 
the Second Circuit held that Section 303(b) is subject-matter 
jurisdictional. Finally, it examines In re Trusted Net Media 
Holdings,77 in which the Eleventh Circuit recognized the circuit 
split, performed a thoughtful analysis of both sides, and 
overruled an earlier case to hold that Section 303(b) does not 
pertain to subject matter jurisdiction. 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis in In re Rubin 
In re Rubin78 came before the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals shortly after Congress passed the 1984 amendments to 
the Bankruptcy Code,79 which added to Section 303 the new 
requirement that petitioning creditors’ claims in an 
involuntary bankruptcy case not be “the subject of a bona fide 
dispute.”80 The debtor in the case, Rubin, submitted to the 
bankruptcy court a timely answer to an involuntary petition 
filed by ten creditors, in which he asserted that the claims 
alleged by the petitioning creditors were contingent and that 
the petition was filed in bad faith.81 A protracted and extensive 
discovery process ensued, during which the debtor repeatedly 
postponed depositions, produced thirty-three boxes of allegedly 
“disorganized and nonsensical” documents, and provided 
schedules of disputed claims that the bankruptcy court 
  
 74 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1041 (11th Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (stating that “[m]ost other courts to consider the issue likewise have 
concluded that § 303(b)’s filing requirements are not subject matter jurisdictional,” and 
listing relevant cases). 
 75 769 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 76 330 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 77 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruling 525 F.3d 1095 (11th 
Cir. 2008). 
 78 769 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 79 See supra Part I.B (chronicling the development of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 80 Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 & n.2; Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 426(b), 98 Stat. 333, 369 (1984).  
 81 In re Rubin, 37 B.R. 232, 233 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984). At the time that Rubin 
filed his answer with the bankruptcy court in 1982, the new bona fide dispute provision 
was not yet in effect. Id. at 232 (decided on February 29, 1984); Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 369, 
392 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2006)) (“The amendments made [to 
§ 303(b)] shall become effective upon the date of enactment of this Act[, July 10, 
1984].”).  
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repeatedly found “insufficient.”82 As a result, the bankruptcy 
court imposed sanctions on Rubin, “striking Rubin’s answer 
and entering an order for relief.”83 The Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel affirmed this order, and Rubin further appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.84  
In his appearance before the Ninth Circuit, Rubin 
argued for the first time that the new “bona fide dispute” 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code was a jurisdictional 
requirement of an involuntary proceeding, and that his case 
should therefore be remanded to the bankruptcy court for a 
determination as to whether it had subject matter jurisdiction.85 
Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately did reverse and remand 
for a trial on the sufficiency of the involuntary petition, it did 
so based on a finding that the bankruptcy court’s discovery 
sanctions were an abuse of discretion—not on the jurisdictional 
basis that Rubin asserted.86 Nevertheless, the court did engage 
in a jurisdictional analysis in order to establish its authority to 
reach the abuse of discretion issue.87 The Ninth Circuit held 
that the undisputed-claims requirement of Section 303(b) was 
not jurisdictional in nature, but rather went “to the merits—an 
element that must be established to sustain an involuntary 
proceeding.”88 In so doing, the court analogized this 
requirement to others in Section 303, which had been labeled 
as “jurisdictional” in prior cases, but were in fact treated as 
“substantive matters which must be proved or waived.”89 The 
  
 82 Rubin, 769 F.2d at 613.  
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 613-14. 
 85 Id. at 614. The bona fide dispute provisions became effective after the 
proceedings in the bankruptcy court but before those in the Ninth Circuit. See supra 
note 81.  
 86 Rubin, 769 F.2d at 619.  
 87 Id. at 614-15. The circuit court held that the bankruptcy court had 
jurisdiction independent of § 303(b), and that “[t]he bankruptcy court’s order striking 
Rubin’s answer and entering an order for relief was a final decision,” and thus that the 
circuit court had appellate jurisdiction to hear this case. Id. at 615. 
 88 Id. at 614-15.  
 89 Id. at 614 n.3. In In re Mason, the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly state 
that the § 303(b) requirements were not jurisdictional in nature, but it did hold that 
the petition’s failure to meet one of those requirements “did not deprive the bankruptcy 
court of jurisdiction to enter a valid order for relief,” when the debtor “waived his right 
to present this defense by failing to raise it in an answer to the petition.” 709 F.2d 
1313, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1983). In In re Visioneering Construction, a case similar to 
Rubin involving a debtor that allegedly obstructed discovery proceedings, the court 
held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on 
the debtor by striking the debtor’s answer and ordering relief against the debtor. 661 
F.2d 119, 123-24 (9th Cir. 1981). Discovery in that case was intended to help the 
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court also suggested that the nature of subject matter 
jurisdiction is such that a failure to satisfy the Section 303(b) 
requirements could not deprive the bankruptcy court of its 
already-existing power to hear the case.90  
B. The Second Circuit’s Analysis in In re BDC 56 LLC 
In In re BDC 56 LLC,91 the debtor, owner of the 
Chambers Hotel in Manhattan, successfully moved for 
dismissal of an involuntary petition filed by three construction 
companies that claimed to be owed money for work performed 
on the hotel.92 The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition 
based on BDC’s assertion that two of the creditors’ claims were 
subject to bona fide disputes93 and that the third lacked 
  
bankruptcy court determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 
Visioneering, 661 F.2d at 121. As a result of striking the debtor’s answer, the 
bankruptcy court treated the allegations in the petition as admitted by the debtor, and 
found that those allegations “were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. 
at 122. The Rubin court, in its analysis of Visioneering, observed that the notion of 
“conferring subject matter jurisdiction” by admission of the parties is entirely 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that “parties cannot confer subject 
matter jurisdiction on a federal court by their consent.” Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 n.3 
(quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702 (1982)). Thus, despite the use of the term “subject matter jurisdiction” in Mason 
and Visioneering, the Rubin court held that those cases did not in fact establish that 
the § 303(b) requirements were anything other than “substantive matters which must 
be proved or waived.” Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 n.3.  
 90 Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 (“Subject matter jurisdiction deals with a court’s 
competence to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings 
in question belong and the power to deal with the general subject involved in the 
action.”). The court cited In re Earl’s Tire Service, Inc., in which a nonpetitioning 
creditor sought to have an involuntary petition against its debtor dismissed in order to 
prevent the trustee from voiding the creditor’s collection activities. Id. (citing In re 
Earl’s Tire Serv., Inc., 6 B.R. 1019, 1020 (D. Del. 1980)). In order to get around its lack 
of standing to object to the petition, the creditor in Earl characterized its objection that 
there were an insufficient number of petitioning creditors as an attack on the court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction. Earl, 6 B.R. at 1021. The Earl court observed that, since 
“Earl’s Tire was qualified to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, it is difficult to 
perceive how an arguable defect in the procedural mechanism for commencing a 
bankruptcy action would deprive the court of its subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 
1022. It went on to warn that courts’ sometimes inaccurate use of the word 
“jurisdictional” does not provide a basis for “‘jurisdictional’ challenges raised by 
disgruntled creditors.” Id. at 1023. 
 91 330 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 92 Id. at 114.  
 93 Id. at 115 (debtor had “a longstanding dispute with [the first creditor] 
concerning its performance under the contract,” and “contended that [the second 
creditor’s] right to payment had not yet arisen under its contract”); see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 303(b); supra note 70. 
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standing.94 After the creditors moved unsuccessfully for 
reconsideration and lost an appeal in the district court, they 
appealed to the Second Circuit.95 At the circuit court, the 
parties argued for different standards of review-with BDC 
seeking review for “clear error” and the creditor-appellants 
urging “de novo review.”96 Instead, the Second Circuit construed 
the Section 303(b) requirements as subject-matter 
jurisdictional and therefore applied plenary review.97 In support 
of its holding that the Section 303(b) requirements were 
jurisdictional, the court stated that “[w]hether an alleged 
debtor is properly before the bankruptcy court in an 
involuntary case is a threshold determination that should be 
made at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings.”98 The 
court cautioned that a result of failing to treat Section 303(b) as 
subject-matter jurisdictional would be that “creditors could, on 
the basis of relatively untested claims, haul a solvent debtor 
with whom they have legitimate disputes into bankruptcy court 
and force it to defend an involuntary proceeding while the 
bankruptcy court leaves for later merits determination whether 
the debtor is even properly before it.”99 In addition to its own 
analysis, the court also relied on two previous holdings within 
the Second Circuit in which the courts repeatedly referred to 
Section 303(b) challenges as “jurisdictional.”100 
  
 94 BDC 56, 330 F.3d at 115 (the third creditor was a subcontractor of another 
party with whom debtor had contracted directly and to whom debtor had tendered 
complete payment). 
 95 Id. at 116. 
 96 Id. at 118. 
 97 “When reviewing a district court’s determination of its subject matter 
jurisdiction, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” 
Id. at 119 (quoting In re Vogel Van & Storage, Inc., 59 F.3d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1995)); see 
also Zappia Middle East Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 249 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (per curium).  
 98 BDC 56, 330 F.3d at 118.  
 99 Id. at 118-19. 
 100 In re Elsa Designs, Ltd., 155 B.R. 859, 863 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating 
that the undisputed-claim requirement of § 303(b) “is both an element of the condition 
upon which a controverted order for relief may be entered and a necessary prerequisite 
for the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction”); In re Onyx Telecomm., Ltd., 60 B.R. 492, 495 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that in a 12(b)(1) facial attack on an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition, “Section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code is the applicable 
jurisdictional provision”). These cases do not explain the reasoning behind their 
conclusions that § 303(b) is jurisdictional. However, it is clear from both cases’ detailed 
discussions of the § 303(b) challenges that the court was indeed analyzing these 
challenges as subject-matter jurisdictional, and not merely making a careless “drive-by 
jurisdictional ruling[].” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)); Elsa, 155 B.R. at 863, 
864 n.2; Onyx, 60 B.R. at 493-97 (discussing at great length the difference between a 
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C. The Eleventh Circuit Addresses the Split in In re 
Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC 
In 2008, in In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC,101 
the Eleventh Circuit convened en banc to rehear an appeal 
from the lower court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition.102 An involuntary Chapter 7 
petition was filed in 2002 by a single creditor of Trusted Net.103 
After the debtor failed to respond, the bankruptcy court 
entered an order for relief.104 Two years later, David W. 
Huffman, an officer of Trusted Net, moved to dismiss the 
petition on the basis that the single-creditor petition failed to 
meet the Section 303(b) requirements for subject matter 
jurisdiction because the claim was subject to a bona fide 
dispute and the debtor had twelve or more creditors.105 
Although the bankruptcy court denied this motion, no appeal 
was taken.106 Two more years passed, at which point a number 
of Trusted Net’s creditors reached a settlement with the 
trustee.107 Huffman, whose deferred salary also made him a 
creditor of Trusted Net,108 was not included in the settlement 
agreement and his objections to the settlement were overruled 
by the bankruptcy court.109 Huffman then filed another motion 
to dismiss the case, in which he raised the same argument that 
he raised in 2004—namely, the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction due to the use of a disputed claim and an 
insufficient number of petitioning creditors.110 In denying the 
motion, the bankruptcy court ruled that the requirements of 
Section 303(b) were not subject-matter jurisdictional and that 
the objection to the petition, raised more than four years after 
the commencement of the proceeding, had been waived by the 
  
facial attack and a factual attack under 12(b)(1) before applying legal principles to the 
facts of that case).  
 101 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 102 Id. at 1037-38. 
 103 Id. at 1037. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 1037-38.  
 106 Id. at 1038. 
 107 Id. 
 108 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1097 (11th Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 109 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1038 (11th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
 110 Id.  
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debtor.111 When the district court affirmed, Trusted Net 
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit solely on the basis that the 
“requirements in Section 303(b) are jurisdictional, and thus 
cannot be waived.”112 Despite concluding that Section 303(b) is 
properly construed as substantive rather than jurisdictional in 
nature, the Eleventh Circuit, found itself to be bound by 
contrary precedent.113 Consequently, with more than a bit of 
hesitation, the court reversed the lower court’s denial of 
Trusted Net’s motion to dismiss;114 however, the court 
subsequently vacated its decision115 and convened en banc to 
rehear the appeal.116 
On rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit undertook a 
systematic analysis of the issue, looking not only at the 
“statutory framework for bankruptcy court jurisdiction and the 
commencement of involuntary bankruptcy cases,” but also the 
split between the Ninth and the Second Circuits.117 In its 
decision, the court concluded that Section 303(b) should not be 
treated as subject-matter jurisdictional for four main reasons: 
(1) there is no indication in the language of the provision that 
Congress intended to condition the court’s jurisdiction on 
satisfaction of the Section 303(b) requirements;118 (2) other 
  
 111 Id. 
 112 Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1097. 
 113 Id. at 1107 (finding itself bound by the precedent of In re All Media Prop., 
Inc., 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’g 5 B.R. 126 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980)). In All 
Media, the former Fifth Circuit analyzed § 303 in one of the first cases to apply the 
then-new Bankruptcy Code in an involuntary proceeding. All Media, 5 B.R. at 131. 
Rather than explicitly stating that § 303(b) was jurisdictional, the All Media court 
made repeated reference to it as such. Id. at 133, 134, 138, 140, 142 (referring to 
various subsections of § 303 as jurisdictional). The Trusted Net court found that this 
treatment nevertheless qualified as a holding, because “a determination that § 303(b) 
is subject matter jurisdictional was a necessary predicate for the court’s consideration 
of [the debtor’s] argument-which was raised neither in the pleadings nor at trial-that 
the creditor . . . did not satisfy the statutory requirement of having an unsecured or 
undersecured claim.” Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1106-07.  
 114 Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1107. 
 115 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 530 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2008).  
 116 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1042 (11th Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (“Because this Court sitting en banc is not bound by prior decisions of a 
panel of this Court or its predecessor, we need not revisit All Media. Instead, we reach 
our own conclusions as to the proper interpretation of § 303(b).” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 117 Id. at 1038. 
 118 The court stated that “the language of § 303(b) does not evince a 
congressional intent to implicate the bankruptcy courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.” 
Id. at 1043. This conclusion was based, in part, on the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. See infra Part III.A.3. The Trusted Net court also noted that 
not only is there “no indication from the text of § 303 that Congress intended 
bankruptcy courts to consider sua sponte at any point in the proceedings whether the 
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similar provisions of the Bankruptcy Code have been 
interpreted as substantive rather than as jurisdictional;119 (3) 
this conclusion is consistent with “the bankruptcy-related 
jurisdictional grant in Title 28, as well as the basic nature of 
subject matter jurisdiction[;]”120 and (4) this conclusion is 
consistent with the other provisions of Section 303.121 After the 
Eleventh Circuit’s en banc holding in Trusted Net, the Second 
Circuit stands alone in treating Section 303(b) as subject-
matter jurisdictional in nature.122  
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERRED IN FINDING SECTION 303(b) 
JURISDICTIONAL 
The Section 303(b) requirements are best viewed as 
substantive rather than subject-matter jurisdictional. First, 
treating the Section 303(b) requirements as substantive better 
comports with the “basic nature of subject matter 
jurisdiction,”123 the specific jurisdictional structure of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and the language and purpose of Section 303 
itself. Additionally, the 2006 United States Supreme Court 
case, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., definitively resolves this issue 
by establishing a test for determining whether a statute is 
jurisdictional or substantive in nature.124 Second, a comparison 
between Section 303 and analogous provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code that have been treated as either substantive 
or jurisdictional demonstrates that Section 303(b) should also 
be construed as nonjurisdictional for the sake of consistency. 
Third, the Second Circuit’s treatment of Section 303(b) as 
jurisdictional actually undercuts the court’s implied goals of 
fairness and judicial efficiency. In fact, a subsequent case 
  
involuntary petition filing requirements have been met,” but that “the statutory 
language strongly suggests the opposite.” Trusted Net, 550 F.3d at 1044.  
 119 “[T]his Court has interpreted similar ‘commencement of the case’ language, 
found elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code, to be non-jurisdictional.” Trusted Net, 550 
F.3d at 1043. 
 120 Id. at 1044. 
 121 Id. at 1044-45 (referring to § 303(c), (h)). 
 122 See supra note 13. 
 123 Id. at 1044. 
 124 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006) (holding that a 
statutory requirement should be treated as subject-matter jurisdictional only when 
Congress evinces a clear intent to make it so, and relying also in part on questions of 
fairness and judicial efficiency).  
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within the Second Circuit125 demonstrates that the circuit’s 
jurisdictional treatment of Section 303(b) is unworkable.  
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Code: 
Does Section 303 Belong? 
Treating Section 303(b) as jurisdictional conflicts with 
general notions of subject matter jurisdiction as well as the 
specific jurisdictional structure of the Bankruptcy Code, and 
prevents the other provisions of Section 303 from operating as 
Congress intended. Furthermore, this interpretation is a direct 
violation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Arbaugh v. Y & H 
Corporation.126 
1. The Nature of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Its 
Place in the Bankruptcy Code 
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to “the courts’ 
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”127 
Because it goes to the fundamental ability of a court to 
entertain and adjudicate a proceeding, it is never too late to 
raise an objection based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
even if the issue has not been introduced until appeal.128 
Nothing that the parties do in the course of litigation can serve 
to create jurisdiction that would otherwise be lacking.129 A lack 
  
 125 In re MarketXT Holdings Corp., 347 B.R. 156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 126 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 127 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (internal 
citation omitted) (emphasis in original); In re Rubin, 769 F.2d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“Subject matter jurisdiction deals with a court’s competence to hear and determine 
cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and the power to 
deal with the general subject involved in the action.” (internal citation omitted)); 
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a 
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547-48 (2008) (“[Subject matter jurisdiction] can 
broadly be defined as the court’s raw, baseline power and legitimate authority to hear 
and resolve the legal and factual issues in a class of cases.”).  
 128 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) & 12(h); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506 (“The objection 
that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by 
a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the 
entry of judgment.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 
455 (2004) (“A litigant generally may raise a court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
at any time in the same civil action, even initially at the highest appellate instance.” 
(internal citations omitted)). But see Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455 n.9 (“Even subject-
matter jurisdiction, however, cannot be attacked collaterally”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982) (listing the few circumstances in which subject matter 
jurisdiction may be attacked post-judgment). 
 129 Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456 (“Characteristically, a court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct . . . .”); Ins. 
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of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by any party or the 
court sua sponte.130 Once a federal court is found to lack subject 
matter jurisdiction, it is not within the court’s discretion to 
retain the case.131 
Like all federal courts, bankruptcy courts have limited 
subject matter jurisdiction,132 the scope and extent of which is 
defined by Congress.133 It is well-established that Congress 
defined the subject matter jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts in 
sections 1334 and 157 of Title 28.134 These sections provide that 
  
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“[N]o 
action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.”).  
 130 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) & 12(h)(3) (“When it appears by suggestion of the 
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action.”); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506 (“The objection that a federal 
court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by a court on its 
own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of 
judgment.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 953 
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One of the hoariest precepts in our federal judicial 
system is that a claim going to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at 
any point in the litigation by any party.”) (emphasis added).  
 131 Compagnie des Bauxite, 456 U.S. at 702 (“‘[T]he rule, springing from the 
nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States is inflexible and without 
exception, which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in 
the exercise if its appellate power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all 
cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record.’” (quoting 
Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)); Morrison v. Allstate 
Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[L]ower federal courts are 
empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a congressional grant of 
jurisdiction, and once a court determines that there has been no grant that covers a 
particular case, the court’s sole remaining act is to dismiss the case for lack of 
jurisdiction.” (internal citation omitted))). Moreover, the question of whether subject 
matter jurisdiction is available is one for the court, and not a jury. 13 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (2008); Wasserman, supra note 127, at 1547-48 
(“[T]he court resolves any factual issues on which jurisdiction turns.”). 
 132 Morrison, 228 F.3d at 1260-61.  
 133 Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (“Only the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court 
created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of 
Congress.”); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 1334 (2006). 
 134 Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452-53 (“Only Congress may determine a lower 
federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction . . . . Congress did so with respect to 
bankruptcy courts in Title 28 . . . .”) (citation omitted); In re Banks, 235 Fed. Appx. 943, 
944 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Two statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157, provide the source of a 
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)); Valley Historic Ltd. P’ship v. Bank 
of New York, 486 F.3d 831, 839 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Whether a bankruptcy court may 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a proceeding is determined by reference to 28 
U.S.C. § 1334.”); In re U.S. Brass Corp., 301 F.3d 296, 303 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The source 
of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157 . . . .”) (quoting 
United States Tr. v. Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 216 B.R. 764, 769 (W.D. Pa. 
1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 1999)); 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 4:4 
(“The present Bankruptcy Code does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction, which is 
established solely by provisions of Title 28.”); see also supra Part I.B. 
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bankruptcy courts may exercise jurisdiction over “any or all 
cases under title 11,” pursuant to referral from the district 
court.135 In contrast to the jurisdictional provisions of Title 28, 
Title 11 “contains the body of substantive law governing the 
federal bankruptcy regime.”136 The practical effect of this 
statutory structure is that a bankruptcy court unquestionably 
has the jurisdiction to entertain an involuntary bankruptcy 
case, which by definition falls under Title 11.137 In the course of 
exercising that jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court’s task is to 
determine whether the substantive requirements for 
bankruptcy relief are satisfied. The question of whether the 
substantive requirements of Title 11 are satisfied does not, in 
any case, affect the threshold determination that the court has 
the jurisdiction to hear and resolve the case.138 The mere 
reference to Title 11 in the statutory provision that establishes 
bankruptcy jurisdiction139 is not a ground for translating all of 
Title 11’s substantive requirements into jurisdictional 
requirements.140  
Given this jurisdictional and statutory framework, it is 
more sensible to conclude that Section 303(b) is unrelated to 
  
 135 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).  
 136 Pathak, supra note 61, at 66 & n.21. Cf. In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, 
LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1098 (11th Cir. 2008) (describing Chapter 7, which defines 
liquidation, as the substantive provisions, and Chapter 3, which contains § 303, as “the 
procedural statute at issue”); see also supra Part I.B.  
 137 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 1334; 11 U.S.C. § 303; In re Trusted Net Media 
Holdings, LLC, No. 07-13429, 2008 WL 5069824, at *8 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2008) (“As a 
class of cases, involuntary bankruptcy cases unquestionably arise under Title 11 . . . .”). 
 138 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Bell v. Hood, 
327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). In Bell, the Supreme Court stated: 
Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the 
averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could 
actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause 
of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of 
jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action in which relief 
could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be 
decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the 
controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that 
the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then 
dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction. 
Bell, 327 U.S. at 682. 
 139 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (“[T]he district courts shall have original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.”); 28 U.S.C § 157(a) (“Each district 
court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings 
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to 
the bankruptcy judges for the district.”).  
 140 See, e.g., In re Bowshier, 313 B.R. 232, 238 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004) (“[I]t is 
important to note that not every statutory requirement is a matter of jurisdiction.”). 
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subject matter jurisdiction. First, Section 303(b) is codified 
within Title 11, which contains the substantive body of 
bankruptcy law, rather than in Title 28, which is the 
jurisdictional grant to federal courts.141 Second, Section 303 
makes no reference to jurisdictional requirements.142 Third, 
treating Section 303(b) as jurisdictional could lead to the 
illogical result of incentivizing an involuntary debtor’s 
default.143 Consider, for example, a hypothetical case in which a 
single creditor files an involuntary bankruptcy petition against 
a debtor with more than twelve qualified creditors. If the 
debtor files an answer asserting that the petition fails to satisfy 
Section 303(b), he will then be required to supply the 
petitioning creditor with a list of his creditors’ names and 
addresses and a description of their claims, in order for notice 
to be sent.144 This allows the petitioning creditor to alert the 
other claimholders to the involuntary petition and gives those 
creditors an opportunity to join the petition with the same 
effect as if they were original petitioning creditors.145 More 
likely than not, the requisite number of creditors will join the 
petition to ensure that they receive some part of the 
distribution of assets, and the debtor will lose his Section 
303(b) jurisdictional defense.  
Now consider a situation in which the same debtor fails 
to file a timely answer to the petition. Akin to a default 
judgment in a civil case,146 if the debtor does not answer, the 
court must allow the bankruptcy case to proceed pursuant to 
  
 141 11 U.S.C. § 303(b); see supra notes 62-63.  
 142 11 U.S.C. § 303; In re Trusted Net Media Holding, 525 F.3d 1095, 1102 
(11th Cir. 2008) (“Section 303(b) does not contain any explicit reference to its 
requirements being jurisdictional in nature.”); cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 
500, 502, 516 (2006) (holding that the employee-numerosity requirement of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(b) is not jurisdictional, in part because “the 15-employee threshold appears in 
a . . . provision that ‘does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the 
jurisdiction of the district courts.’”) (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 
U.S. 385, 394 (1982)).  
 143 Admittedly, treating § 303(b) as substantive could lead to the undesirable 
result of allowing a creditor to force a debtor into bankruptcy on the basis of a single 
claim that would be better resolved through state collection procedures, or on the basis 
of a disputed claim. See infra Part III.C.2. However, this result is consistent with the 
judicial policy that a litigant’s default may work to its detriment, and is more sensible 
than the alternative. Id. 
 144 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1003(b).  
 145 11 U.S.C. § 303(c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1003(b) and advisory committee note 
(d). This arrangement is sensible given that the debtor is the party with the most 
knowledge about his or her own financial affairs. See In re Coppertone Commc’ns, Inc., 
96 B.R. 233, 236 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).  
 146 See FED. R. CIV. P. 55.  
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Section 303(h).147 However, if Section 303(b) is treated as 
subject-matter jurisdictional, a default would actually be in the 
debtor’s best interest since he could then move to dismiss the 
petition after the court has entered relief against him—still 
early enough to raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a 
defense but too late for additional creditors to join the 
petition.148 In order to incentivize full disclosure by the debtor, 
it makes far more sense to treat the requirement of three or 
more petitioning creditors as a waivable affirmative defense, 
i.e., substantive rather than jurisdictional.149 Under this 
approach, a debtor that fails to disclose the existence of 
claimholders gives up his Section 303(b) defense150 and may be 
left with undischargeable debts if his creditors are not notified 
of the bankruptcy.151  
2. A Non-Jurisdictional Interpretation Ensures that 
Section 303 Operates Effectively 
When examined in conjunction with the other 
subsections of Section 303, it is plain that Section 303(b) must 
be treated as nonjurisdictional in order for the statute to 
operate sensibly.152 First, not only does a jurisdictional reading 
  
 147 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (“If the petition is not timely controverted, the court 
shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under 
which the petition was filed.”); 2 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 22:12.  
 148 See 11 U.S.C. § 303(c) (“After the filing of a petition under this section but 
before the case is dismissed or relief is ordered, a creditor . . . may join in the petition 
with the same effect as if such joining creditor were a petitioning creditor . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). Moreover, while bankruptcy courts have broad powers to remedy 
bad faith conduct by litigants, see 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); 2 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 
44, at § 13:4, they cannot use their equitable powers to expand the scope of their 
jurisdiction. 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 4:5 (“The grant of equitable 
power to a bankruptcy court does not create, confer, or supply subject-matter 
jurisdiction if it is otherwise lacking.”). Thus, if § 303(b) was jurisdictional, the 
bankruptcy court would be unable to rely on its equitable powers to allow joinder of 
creditors after the entry of relief, as this would amount to a unilateral expansion of its 
jurisdiction. Cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (explaining that bankruptcy 
courts cannot use the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to expand the scope of 
their jurisdiction); In re Granger Garage, Inc., 921 F.2d 74, 77 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(“[Section] 105(a) [is not a] jurisdictional provision[]. The subject matter jurisdiction of 
the bankruptcy court is limited to that which congress specifically grants.”).  
 149 In re Coppertone Commc’ns, Inc. 96 B.R. 233, 236 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989). 
 150 Id. 
 151 See, e.g., 3 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 57:20 (“Under Code 
§ 523(a)(3), creditors who are neither listed by the debtor in the schedule of creditors 
filed with the court, nor who have otherwise learned of the bankruptcy case within a 
limited period of time, may have their claims excepted from discharge.”).  
 152 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1102 (11th Cir. 
2008) (“Interpreting § 303(b) as non-jurisdictional . . . results in a harmonious 
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of Section 303(b) incentivize a debtor’s default when combined 
with Section 303(c),153 but it also causes Section 303(c) to 
operate in contradiction of the general principles of subject 
matter jurisdiction.154 If the bankruptcy court were to allow a 
nonpetitioning creditor to “join in the petition with the same 
effect as if such joining creditor were a petitioning creditor 
under [Section 303(b)],”155 it would essentially be acting so as to 
confer jurisdiction upon itself, thus violating a rule that the 
Supreme Court has described as “inflexible.”156 By contrast, if a 
Section 303(b) defect is merely a substantive failure, then 
permitting a creditor to join the petition would effectuate 
Section 303(c) while adhering to the rules of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  
Next, a jurisdictional reading of Section 303(b) would 
also cause Section 303(d) to violate general principles of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Section 303(d)’s limitation on who may file 
an answer to an involuntary petition157 has been interpreted as 
an exhaustive list.158 This list indicates that creditors, including 
  
operation of the statutory subsections.”), overruled by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(en banc).  
 153 See supra Part III.A.1.  
 154 See id. (discussing general principles of subject matter jurisdiction); In re 
Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1044-45 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(“[I]t seems anomalous at best to conclude that a bankruptcy court, which lacks 
jurisdiction over an involuntary case because the petition was defectively filed, 
subsequently may create jurisdiction for itself by permitting additional creditors to join 
the petition [under § 303(c)].”).  
 155 11 U.S.C. § 303(c).  
 156 Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702 (1982) (“‘[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of 
the United States is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, of its 
own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in the exercise if its appellate power, that of 
all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not 
affirmatively appear in the record.’”) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 
111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)); Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (“[L]ower federal courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there 
has been a congressional grant of jurisdiction, and once a court determines that there 
has been no grant that covers a particular case, the court’s sole remaining act is to 
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.”).  
 157 11 U.S.C. § 303(d) (“The debtor, or a general partner in a partnership 
debtor that did not join in the petition, may file an answer to a petition under this 
section.”). 
 158 See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011(a), (e) (“The debtor named in an 
involuntary petition . . . may contest the petition. . . . No other pleadings shall be 
permitted . . . .”); In re MarketXT Holdings Corp., 347 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (interpreting § 303(d) to mean that “only ‘[t]he debtor, or a general partner in a 
partnership debtor that did not join in the petition, may file an answer”) (emphasis 
added); In re Taylor & Assocs., L.P., 191 B.R. 374, 378-79, 381 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
1996) (this rule “prohibit[s] creditors from contesting an involuntary petition in order 
to prevent creditors from protecting a preference or retaining some other unfair 
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petitioning creditors who are undoubtedly parties to the 
litigation, are not authorized to raise objections to an 
involuntary petition based on a Section 303(b) deficiency.159 It is 
fundamental, however, that any party may raise an objection 
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.160 Thus, if Section 
303(b) is jurisdictional in nature, one of the most basic and 
longstanding features of subject matter jurisdiction would not 
apply. Rather than creating an unprecedented exception to the 
well-accepted principles of subject matter jurisdiction, the more 
logical approach is to interpret Section 303(b) in a manner that 
is consistent with both the principles of subject matter 
jurisdiction and the statutory structure to which Section 303(b) 
belongs.161 This approach leads to the conclusion that Section 
303(b) is nonjurisdictional.  
3. Distinguishing Jurisdictional and Substantive 
Statutory Provisions Under Arbaugh: Is the Split 
Over Section 303(b) Moot? 
Part of the difficulty in characterizing any statutory 
provision as jurisdictional or substantive stems from the 
frequent and longstanding misuse of the word “jurisdiction” by 
courts.162 In 2006, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,163 when the Court faced the question of 
whether an employee-numerosity requirement in Title VII was 
  
advantage”); In re Westerleigh Development Corp., 141 B.R. 38, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In 
re New Era Co., 115 B.R. 41, 44-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (listing cases in support of 
this proposition).  
 159 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011. The rationale for this rule is that “a creditor may 
have an incentive to protect a preference or to gain some unfair advantage at the 
expense of other creditors, contrary to the policy of requiring an equitable distribution 
of the debtor’s assets among all creditors.” New Era, 115 B.R. at 45.  
 160 See supra note 130.  
 161 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1102 (11th Cir. 
2008) (“Interpreting § 303(b) as non-jurisdictional, on the other hand, results in a 
harmonious operation of the statutory subsections.”). 
 162 Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (“Courts, including this Court, 
it is true, have been less than meticulous in this regard; they have more than 
occasionally used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in 
rules of court.”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) 
(“‘Jurisdiction,’ it has been observed, ‘is a word of many, too many, meanings . . . .’”); Da 
Silva v. Kinsho Intern. Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Court decisions often 
obscure the issue by stating that the court is dismissing for ‘lack of jurisdiction’ when 
some threshold fact has not been established, without explicitly considering whether 
the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a 
claim.”); United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1990) (“As for ‘jurisdiction’: 
the word is a many-hued term . . . .”).  
 163 546 U.S. 500 (2006).  
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subject-matter jurisdictional or substantive.164 In Arbaugh, the 
plaintiff brought a Title VII suit against her employer alleging 
sexual harassment.165 Two weeks after the trial court entered 
judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant moved to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the word 
“employer,” as defined under Title VII, included only those 
people who have “fifteen or more employees.”166 The defendant 
asserted that he employed fewer than fifteen people and, 
therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over the case.167 In its 
decision, the Supreme Court held that courts should construe 
statutory requirements as nonjurisdictional unless Congress 
makes it clear that the requirement is intended to function as a 
jurisdictional limitation.168 The Court also addressed the 
tendency of lower courts to carelessly label dismissals as 
“jurisdictional” when they were in fact based on a party’s 
failure to establish a substantive element of its claim,169 and 
characterized “such unrefined dispositions as ‘drive-by 
jurisdictional rulings’ that should be accorded ‘no precedential 
effect’ on the question whether the federal court had authority 
to adjudicate the claim in suit.”170 In addition to the main 
legislative intent test, the Arbaugh Court also mentioned the 
“‘unfair[ness]’ and ‘waste of judicial resources’” that would 
result from construing the employee numerosity requirement 
as jurisdictional, as factors in its decision.171  
When the Eleventh Circuit first addressed the question 
of how to characterize Section 303(b) in Trusted Net, it held 
that it was not governed by Arbaugh.172 The original Trusted 
Net court found that because All Media explicitly treated 
  
 164 Id. at 503.  
 165 Id. at 503-04. 
 166 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503-04. 
 167 Id. at 504.  
 168 Id. at 509, 515-16. The Arbaugh Court stated:  
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s 
scope shall count as jurisdictional, the courts and litigants will be duly 
instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. . . . But when 
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, 
courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.  
Id. at 515-16. The Court also provided a nonexhaustive list of statutes in which 
Congress clearly stated its intent that a requirement be jurisdictional. Id. at 516 n.11. 
 169 Id. at 511. 
 170 Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). 
 171 Id. at 515. 
 172 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1104 n.11 (11th 
Cir. 2008), overruled by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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Section 303(b) as jurisdictional, as opposed to simply labeling it 
as such, the decision was not a “drive-by jurisdictional ruling”173 
and therefore must be treated as binding precedent.174 When 
the Eleventh Circuit subsequently reheard Trusted Net en 
banc, however, it overruled All Media after applying the 
Arbaugh factors and finding that the Section 303(b) 
requirements are in fact not subject-matter jurisdictional.175 
Consistent with the main test articulated in Arbaugh, the en 
banc panel focused primarily on the failure of Section 303(b) to 
“speak in jurisdictional terms.”176 Although the Trusted Net 
court did not address the question of “‘unfair[ness]’ and ‘waste 
of judicial resources,’”177 such considerations would have also 
militated in favor of its conclusion.178 Indeed, a jurisdictional 
reading of Section 303(b) would allow the debtor to 
strategically default so as to prevent the petitioning creditors 
from curing a defective petition,179 a blatantly unfair strategy. It 
would also allow creditors to squirrel away jurisdictional 
objections to be used in the event that the involuntary 
bankruptcy case does not appear to be progressing in their 
favor,180 thus wasting the court’s time and depleting the debtor’s 
estate.181 In the face of Trusted Net’s well-reasoned application 
of Arbaugh and the fairness and efficiency considerations 
  
 173 Id.; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91. 
 174 Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1104 n.11. In fact, this panel could have overruled 
the All Media precedent without having to convene en banc. Id. at 1104 n.7 (“We 
have . . . held that when an earlier panel of this court has adopted a lower court’s order, 
that order is binding precedent unless and until overruled by the Supreme Court or this 
Court sitting en banc.”) (first emphasis added). While the Supreme Court did not 
expressly hold that § 303(b) was nonjurisdictional, it did issue a clear directive to 
courts that, “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as 
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). 
 175 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (11th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). “Applying the Supreme Court’s . . . recent Arbaugh test, § 303(b)’s 
requirements are not subject matter jurisdictional,” because “the language of § 303(b) 
does not evince a congressional intent to implicate the bankruptcy courts’ subject 
matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 1046.  
 176 Trusted Net, 550 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515). 
 177 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515. 
 178 The emphasis on efficiency, demonstrated in FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001, also 
applies in the context of involuntary bankruptcy cases. See supra note 21; FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 1013 (“The court shall determine the issues of a contested [involuntary] 
petition at the earliest practicable time . . . .”).  
 179 See supra Part III.A.1.  
 180 See supra notes 158-159.  
 181 11 U.S.C. § 503 (providing for certain bankruptcy related expenses to be 
paid out of the debtor’s estate).  
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suggested by the Arbaugh Court, the Second Circuit’s position 
is now even more tenuous.  
B. Analogous Provisions in the Bankruptcy Code 
Like Section 303(b), other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code have been the subject of debate regarding whether they 
are jurisdictional or substantive in nature. Significantly, most 
of these provisions have been deemed to be nonjurisdictional. A 
brief look at the rationales provided for some of these 
provisions suggests that the debate over Section 303(b) should 
be similarly resolved.182 
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a) and 549(d): Time Limit on 
Adversary Proceedings 
Sections 546(a) and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code 
establish a time limit after which a trustee can no longer bring 
certain adversary proceedings to recover property of the 
debtor’s estate that has been transferred away.183 In In re Pugh, 
the Eleventh Circuit held that these sections were not 
jurisdictional, but rather waivable statutes of limitations.184 In 
Pugh, the debtors did not raise the untimeliness of the trustee’s 
adversary proceeding in their response since they asserted that 
it was jurisdictional and therefore could be raised at any time.185 
In refuting this interpretation, the court relied on the “plain 
language of the provisions themselves,” the overall statutory 
  
 182 Cf. Wasserman, supra note 127, at 1547-49 (“[I]f only some jurisdictional 
grants are bound up with the merits, there is no explanation or justification for why 
some merits issues should be jurisdictional and others not.”).  
 183 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a) & 549(d). The trustee’s ability to void transfers of a 
debtor’s property is referred to as his “avoiding power.” See, e.g., 1 NORTON & NORTON, 
supra note 44, at § 3:11. The trustee uses this power in order to maximize the value of 
the debtor’s estate for distribution to creditors, and to prevent preferential treatment of 
favored creditors. Id. at § 22:12. 
 184 In re Pugh, 158 F.3d 530, 530 (11th Cir. 1998). The court characterized the 
issue in this case as  
whether these code provisions constitute grants of subject matter jurisdiction 
that leave a court without any authority to hear certain proceedings-i.e., that 
extinguish the right of action itself by divesting a court of its subject matter 
jurisdiction over certain proceedings-after the limitations period has elapsed, 
or whether they are true statutes of limitations that restrict the power of a 
court to grant certain remedies in a proceeding over which it has subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Id. at 533-34. 
 185 Id. at 532. 
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scheme, decisions of other courts, and the legislative history in 
concluding that the limitations were not jurisdictional in 
nature.186 In its rejection of the alternative view, the Pugh court 
noted that the key precedent in support of that approach was 
“devoid of analysis”187 and relied on the faulty assumption that 
a limitation on a cause of action is automatically a limitation 
on a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over that cause of 
action.188 As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Trusted Net, “[t]he 
reasons in Pugh apply equally to Section 303(b).”189 
2. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e): Limits on Amount of Debt to 
Qualify for Chapter 13 Relief 
Under Section 109(e), the Code places a statutory cap on 
the amount of debt an individual can owe and still be a 
Chapter 13 debtor.190 In Rudd v. Laughlin,191 the bankruptcy 
trustee alleged that the debtors had abused the bankruptcy 
system by filing six Chapter 13 petitions in a six-year period, 
despite their inability to qualify as Chapter 13 debtors under 
Section 109(e) due to the amount of their unsecured debt.192 In 
response to the trustee’s attempt to convert their case into a 
  
 186 Id. at 538. This is the majority view. See, e.g., In re Outboard Marine Corp., 
299 B.R. 488, 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (“The clear weight of recent authority bolsters 
the conclusion that § 546(a) is [nonjurisdictional].”); In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., 
294 B.R. 164, 174 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2003) (“The court finds the analysis in Pugh to be 
persuasive.”); In re Rodriguez, 283 B.R. 112, 120 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Based on the 
Pugh case and the decisions cited in Pugh, the Court finds that Section 546(a) is 
[nonjurisdictional].”); In re Klayman, 228 B.R. 805, 806 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“The 
case of [Pugh] . . . follows the majority view.”). 
 187 Pugh, 158 F.3d at 535-36 (“[T]he few other courts that have adopted this 
jurisdictional view offer little analysis to support their position.”). The Eleventh Circuit 
made the same observation with regard to § 303(b) in Trusted Net, where it noted that 
“[a]lthough some bankruptcy courts earlier had reached the same conclusion as the 
Second Circuit [in BDC], that § 303(b) is subject matter jurisdictional, they did so 
without explanation.” In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1101 n.5 
(11th Cir. 2008), overruled by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). This pattern 
lends credence to the Supreme Court’s concern over “drive-by jurisdictional rulings.” 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006). 
 188 Pugh, 158 F.3d at 535-36.  
 189 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1044 (11th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). Significantly, at least one bankruptcy court within the Second Circuit 
has adopted Pugh’s reasoning. In re Rodriguez, 283 B.R. 112, 119-20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2001).  
 190 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). The current amounts are $336,900 for unsecured debt, 
and $1,010,650 for secured debt, and are subject to adjustment every three years. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 104, 109(e).  
 191 866 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 192 Id. at 1041.  
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Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtors asserted that the 
bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
case due to the Section 109(e) deficiency.193 When the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conversion to Chapter 7, 
it agreed with the district court that the Section 109(e) 
deficiency was more akin to a failure to state a claim than a 
jurisdictional defect.194 The circuit court noted that the 
congressional grant of subject matter jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy cases comes from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157 and, 
unlike the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332, makes no reference to an amount in controversy.195 This 
analysis applies with equal force to Section 303(b). To the 
extent that the Rudd court rejected the notion that “a case filed 
by an ineligible debtor is a nullity, and the court has no 
jurisdiction to convert the nonexistent case to another 
chapter,”196 it would be illogical to conclude that an involuntary 
case filed by an insufficient number of creditors is incapable of 
being cured.197 Instead, it more closely resembles a failure to 
state a claim, which does not implicate subject matter 
jurisdiction.198  
3. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1): Credit Counseling 
Requirement 
Both Section 301 (governing voluntary petitions) and 
Section 303 (governing involuntary petitions) state that a 
bankruptcy case can only be commenced by or against one who 
  
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 1041-42. 
 195 Id. The Rudd court relied in part on a Fifth Circuit case in which the court 
recognized a split in authority over whether § 109 was jurisdictional. Promenade Nat’l 
Bank v. Phillips, 844 F.2d 230, 236 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit noted that 
“the courts holding that the issue is not jurisdictional generally have engaged in an 
analysis of the issue, while the courts holding that it is a matter of jurisdiction have 
not.” Promenade, 844 F.2d at 235 n.2. Once again, the Supreme Court’s concern about 
“drive-by jurisdictional rulings” appears well-founded. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006); supra 
note 187. 
 196 Rudd, 866 F.2d at 1041. 
 197 At least one bankruptcy court within the Second Circuit agrees with the 
reasoning in Pugh. In re Toronto, 165 B.R. 746, 756 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (“Section 
109(e) relates to the eligibility of a debtor for chapter 13 relief, not the jurisdiction of 
the court.”); cf. Cavaliere v. Sapir, 208 B.R. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1997) (describing 
§ 109(e) as jurisdictional, though without any meaningful analysis); In re Rifkin, 124 
B.R. 626, 629 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); In re Jerome, 112 B.R. 563, 564 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).  
 198 Cf. Rudd, 866 F.2d at 1041. 
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“may be a debtor.”199 In 2005, amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code added the requirement that an individual must receive 
credit counseling within the 180 days preceding the bankruptcy 
petition in order to be a debtor.200 In the context of a voluntary 
Chapter 13 petition where the debtor did not complete his 
credit counseling within the allotted time, one bankruptcy 
court has held that it “simply lacks jurisdiction over a debtor’s 
case where the debtor fails to comply with [the credit 
counseling requirement].”201 For debtors facing involuntary 
bankruptcy, this holding must have prompted shouts of joy—if 
they simply refused credit counseling, they could not qualify as 
debtors under Title 11 and the court would have to dismiss the 
involuntary petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Not 
surprisingly, later courts have rejected this contention both on 
the basis of its sheer absurdity202 and statutory construction.203 
Nonetheless, it provides a good example of a nonjurisdictional204 
provision within Title 11 that cannot be logically distinguished 
from the statutory requirements imposed by Section 303(b).  
  
 199 11 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 303(a) (2006).  
 200 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (“[A]n individual may not be a debtor under this title 
unless such individual has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the 
petition by such individual, received . . . credit counseling . . . .”).  
 201 In re Giles, 361 B.R. 212, 214 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007).  
 202 In re Allen, 378 B.R. 151, 153 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (“While the court 
recognizes that § 303(a) requires that a person who is the subject of an involuntary 
case qualify as a debtor, interpreting this provision as requiring that an involuntary 
debtor comply with section 109(h)(1) would lead to an absurd result.”).  
 203 Id. at 153 (finding that because “[t]he statutory language of section 
109(h)(1) requires that the credit counseling occur before ‘the filing of the petition by 
such individual,’” the requirement only applied to voluntary cases) (emphasis in 
original).  
 204 That the credit counseling requirement is unrelated to subject matter 
jurisdiction is further evidenced by the fact that there are bases, albeit limited ones, 
upon which a court may waive the requirement. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A). The ability of 
the court to waive the credit counseling requirement is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the conclusion that this requirement is subject-matter jurisdictional. Morrison v. 
Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (once a court determines that 
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, “the court’s sole remaining act is to dismiss the case 
for lack of jurisdiction”). 
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C. Breaking Down BDC 
1. The Second Circuit’s Argument “fails on its own 
terms”205 
Perhaps one of the biggest weaknesses of the Second 
Circuit’s holding in BDC that Section 303(b) is jurisdictional is 
its surprisingly superficial reasoning. As the Trusted Net court 
pointed out in its first analysis of Section 303(b), the Second 
Circuit failed to address the interaction of Section 303(b) with 
the other subsections of Section 303 and “ignore[d] the fact that 
subject matter jurisdiction turns only upon whether the court 
has the statutorily-conferred power to hear the case before it, 
and therefore has nothing to do with the speedy determination 
of claims or whether an alleged debtor—or any other party—is 
‘properly before the . . . court.’”206 To the extent that the Second 
Circuit specifically considered the proper characterization of 
Section 303(b) and explicitly held that it is jurisdictional in 
nature,207 its holding can hardly be called a “drive-by 
jurisdictional ruling[].”208 At the same time, it also falls short of 
the detailed treatment given by courts that have found Section 
303(b) to be nonjurisdictional.209 The BDC court provided only a 
summary rationale for its conclusion, stating that “[w]hether 
an alleged debtor is properly before the bankruptcy court in an 
involuntary case is a threshold determination that should be 
made at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings,” so that 
creditors cannot “haul a solvent debtor with whom they have 
legitimate disputes into bankruptcy court and force it to defend 
an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding while the bankruptcy 
court leaves for a later merits determination whether the 
debtor is even properly before it.”210 While the propriety of the 
involuntary petition is undoubtedly something that should be 
  
 205 In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1102 (11th Cir. 
2008). 
 206 Id. at 1102 (quoting In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 207 BDC 56, 330 F.3d at 118 (“We believe the more sound view is that the 
[§ 303(b) undisputed claim] requirement is subject matter jurisdictional, and now so 
hold.”).  
 208 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). 
 209 See, e.g., Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1100-04; In re Saunders, 379 B.R. 847, 
855-57 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007); In re Earl’s Tire Svc., Inc., 6 B.R. 1019, 1021-23 (D. Del. 
1980).  
 210 BDC 56, 330 F.3d at 118. 
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resolved as soon as possible,211 labeling Section 303(b) as 
jurisdictional allows precisely the opposite to occur since a lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.212 The 
BDC court failed to address this issue.  
The unworkable nature of the BDC holding became 
evident in In re MarketXT Holdings, 213 a 2006 decision by a 
bankruptcy court in the Second Circuit. In MarketXT, the court 
entered involuntary Chapter 11 relief against a debtor who 
failed to file a motion opposing the petition.214 Approximately 
six months later, a nonpetitioning creditor sought to have the 
case against the debtor dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioning creditor’s claim was 
subject to a bona fide dispute.215 While maintaining that it was 
adhering to the Second Circuit’s ruling that Section 303(b) is 
jurisdictional,216 the bankruptcy court nevertheless denied the 
creditor’s motion to dismiss, relying on Section 303(d)’s 
provision that only the debtor may file an answer to an 
involuntary petition.217 Although the court acknowledged the 
circuit’s position that Section 303(b) is subject-matter 
jurisdictional,218 it simultaneously stripped the provision of two 
  
 211 Id.; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001. 
 212 Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1102 (“BDC’s rationale also fails on its own terms 
. . . [because i]f § 303(b)’s requirements are subject matter jurisdictional, an 
involuntary debtor could raise a § 303(b) challenge at any point in the proceedings, 
whereas if § 303(b) is non-jurisdictional, § 303(h) and Rule 1013 would require that the 
issue of the petitioning creditors’ compliance with § 303(b) be determined at the outset-
as a threshold matter-or be forever waived.”). Admittedly, while the nonjurisdictional 
approach would put the issue of the petition’s propriety to rest if not raised within a 
certain period of time, it would do so at the expense of an actual determination of that 
issue. However, there are other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that provide the 
debtor with protection against frivolous involuntary petitions, such that it is not 
necessary to rely on a jurisdictional reading of § 303(b) to accomplish this goal. See 
infra Part III.C.2.  
 213 347 B.R. 156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 214 Id. at 158. 
 215 Id. at 158-59. 
 216 Id. at 160. Interestingly, the MarketXT court failed to even acknowledge 
United Marine, LLC v. Just for Windows, Inc., decided one year before BDC, in which 
the court recognized that “[t]he weight of the authority clearly supports the holding 
that the § 303(b) requirements are not jurisdictional and that the affirmative defense 
that a petition does not comply with such requirements may be waived pursuant to 
§ 303(h).” No. 01 Civ. 5066(HB), 2002 WL 72933, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2002). 
In United Marine, the court found that the debtor had waived his right to challenge the 
petition based on an insufficient number of petitioning creditors and failure to allege 
unsecured claims in the required aggregate amount. Id. at *1.  
 217 MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160; see 11 U.S.C. § 303(d) (2006) (“The debtor, or a 
general partner in a partnership debtor that did not join in the petition, may file an 
answer to a petition under this section.”); see also supra Part III.A.2. 
 218 MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160. 
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of the most fundamental characteristics of subject matter 
jurisdiction—namely, that it can be raised by any party, at any 
time, and that when it is lacking, it cannot be conferred by the 
actions of the parties or the court.219 The court’s justification 
was that this interpretation was necessary to preserve the 
function of Section 303(d).220 Interestingly, the court held that 
the Second Circuit’s policy of determining “whether an alleged 
debtor is properly before the bankruptcy court in an 
involuntary proceeding” as early as possible is carried out by 
Section 303(h),221 which directs a bankruptcy court to enter 
relief against a debtor who fails to controvert an involuntary 
petition.222 Accordingly, there should be no need to achieve this 
objective by calling Section 303(b) jurisdictional. In fact, 
treating it as such would actually undermine the goal of 
resolving the propriety of the petition as soon as possible.223 
In the end, the only sensible part of the MarketXT 
opinion is the outcome.224 It is apparent and well-recognized 
that a creditor is not able to move for dismissal of an 
  
 219 Id.; see supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the fundamental rules of subject 
matter jurisdiction). 
 220 MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160; see 11 U.S.C. § 303(d). The bankruptcy court 
acknowledged that subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged by any party but 
stated that this was “no justification for invalidating another part of the same statute 
[i.e., § 303(d)].” MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160. The court also stated that “[n]othing in 
BDC 56 LLC suggests that the jurisdictional aspect of § 303(b) would trump the 
command of § 303(h) that an order for relief be entered if the petition is not ‘timely 
controverted,’” Id. at 162, indicating that it might also reject a debtor’s motion for 
dismissal for a § 303(b) deficiency if it is untimely.  
 221 Id. at 161-62 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re BDC 56 
LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 222 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (“If the petition is not timely controverted, the court 
shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under 
which the petition was filed.”).  
 223 See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 224 What MarketXT demonstrates is a lower court bound by an unworkable 
precedent, that must fashion a coherent argument for its holding from contradictory 
authority. In its battle to make sense of BDC’s holding, the bankruptcy court even 
misconstrued a passage from a widely recognized authority on bankruptcy when it 
stated that “subject matter jurisdiction arises ‘in other contexts under section 303, 
most notably subsections (b) and (h).’” MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 161 (quoting 2 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 303.02[6] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2002)). 
In fact, that source was referring to the issue addressed in BDC, and went on to 
conclude that “[t]he better argument is that the . . . requirements of section 303(b) can 
be waived.” COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 303.08[3]. Moreover, the MarketXT court also 
downplayed the significance of the Supreme Court’s holding in Arbaugh, stating merely 
that “in recent decisions the Supreme Court has narrowed the effect of the term 
[‘jurisdiction’].” MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 162. Rather than acknowledge that the Second 
Circuit improvidently labeled § 303(b) as jurisdictional, the bankruptcy court simply 
declined to extend BDC. Id.  
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involuntary bankruptcy case.225 However, it remains unclear 
how the Second Circuit will respond to a case where the debtor 
waits to raise the Section 303(b) defense until after an order for 
involuntary bankruptcy relief has been entered. The mere fact 
that the outcome of this hypothetical is uncertain points to the 
flaws in the circuit’s current approach.226  
2. Making Sense of BDC 
What makes the Second Circuit’s conclusion in BCD all 
the more puzzling is that the determination that Section 303(b) 
is subject-matter jurisdictional was unnecessary given the 
procedural posture of the case.227 Specifically, the debtor filed a 
timely response and therefore could raise affirmative defenses 
based on the substantive requirements of Section 303(b),228 thus 
making the issue of Section 303(b)’s construction superfluous.229 
The circuit court purported to address the issue to determine 
the proper standard of appellate review230 when it adopted a 
plenary standard of review231 over the more commonly-accepted 
  
 225 See, e.g., MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160 (interpreting § 303(d) to mean that 
“only ‘[t]he debtor, or a general partner in a partnership debtor that did not join in the 
petition, may file an answer’”) (emphasis added). “A ‘creditor is not authorized to 
contest an involuntary petition because a creditor may have an incentive to protect a 
preference or to gain some unfair advantage at the expense of other creditors.’” Id. 
(quoting In re Westerleigh Dev. Corp., 141 B.R. 38, 40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)) 
(internal alterations omitted); In re Taylor & Assocs., L.P., 191 B.R. 374, 378-79, 381 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (this rule “prohibit[s] creditors from contesting an 
involuntary petition in order to prevent creditors from protecting a preference or 
retaining some other unfair advantage”); In re New Era Co., 115 B.R. 41, 44-45 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (listing cases in support of this proposition). This interpretation is also 
reinforced by FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011(a). 
 226 The two apparent options in such a case are: (1) that the court will apply 
the BDC holding that § 303(b) is jurisdictional, and allow the debtor to obtain dismissal 
even after entry of relief by showing that the debt is subject to a bona fide dispute; or 
(2) that it will distinguish BDC on the grounds that the debtor from BDC moved for 
dismissal before entry of relief, and deny dismissal to the untimely debtor. See, e.g., 
United Marine L.L.C. v. Just for Windows, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 5066(HB), 2002 WL 72933 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2002) (where the court essentially took the latter approach). 
Because MarketXT has already demonstrated that BDC’s version of subject matter 
jurisdiction allows for exceptions, there is no principled way of predicting what further 
exceptions may be made on a case-by-case basis.  
 227 The debtor answered the involuntary petition within twenty days, as 
mandated by FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011(b). Key Mech. Inc. v. BDC 56 LLC, No. 01 Civ. 
10169(RWS), 2002 WL 449856, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2002); supra note 72.  
 228 Key Mech., 2002 WL 449856, at *1. 
 229  See supra note 72. 
 230 In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 231 Id. at 116-17, 119. 
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review for clear error.232 However, if the court’s objective was 
simply to apply a more rigorous standard of review than the 
clearly erroneous standard, it could have accomplished it 
without construing Section 303(b) as subject-matter 
jurisdictional.233 In sum, the facts and procedural posture of 
BDC simply did not require the court to hold that Section 
303(b) is jurisdictional. 
The Second Circuit’s concern with the potential 
unfairness of involuntary bankruptcy cases is legitimate—
treating Section 303(b) as substantive could lead to the 
undesirable result of allowing creditors to force debtors into 
bankruptcy on the basis of disputed claims234 because a Section 
303(b) deficiency would be an affirmative defense that is 
waived if not timely raised.235 However, while the waiver of 
affirmative defenses for failure to raise them in a timely 
manner arguably leads to unfairness in any circumstance, it 
nonetheless is uniformly accepted by the federal courts.236 The 
  
 232 See id. at 118 n.3 (collecting cases in which other circuit courts “held that 
the clearly erroneous standard of review applies on appeal of a bankruptcy court’s 
determination that a bona fide dispute exists.”). 
 233 The courts that have adopted a per se rule of reviewing a bankruptcy 
court’s findings regarding a bona fide dispute for clear error have justified it on the 
basis that such a determination “will often depend . . . upon an assessment of 
witnesses’ credibilities and other factual considerations.” In re Rimell, 946 F.2d 1363, 
1365 (8th Cir. 1991). When facts are in dispute, this approach is proper. FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 8013. However, in cases where the facts concerning the claim are not in 
dispute, the question of whether there is a “bona fide dispute” under § 303(b) can be 
treated as a question of law and given de novo review. See, e.g., In re Dilley, 339 B.R. 1, 
5 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (“Although some appellate courts suggest that the existence of 
a bona fide dispute is a fact question and thus the clearly erroneous standard always 
applies, we decline to adopt a per se rule.”) (footnote omitted). Although the Dilley court 
cited BDC for this proposition, it did so without adopting BDC’s holding that § 303(b) is 
jurisdictional. Id.  
 234 See supra note 70.  
 235 See, e.g., In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1037 
(11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]e conclude that § 303(b)’s requirements are not subject 
matter jurisdictional in nature, and therefore can be waived.”); In re Mason, 709 F.2d 
1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that the debtor “waived his right to present [a 
§ 303(b)] defense by failing to raise it in an answer to the petition”). 
 236 5 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1278 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE] (“It 
is a frequently stated proposition of virtually universal acceptance by the federal courts 
that a failure to plead an affirmative defense as required by Federal Rule 8(c) results 
in the waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case . . . .”); id. at § 1278 n.1 
(collecting cases). The purpose of this rule is to provide the plaintiff with “fair notice of 
the defense that is being advanced.” Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 
2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The concern is that a defendant 
should not be permitted to lie behind a log and ambush a plaintiff with an unexpected 
defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A bankruptcy pleading 
also is subject to the Rule 8 requirements as to the pleading of . . . affirmative 
defenses . . . .” FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1229. 
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apparent desire of the Second Circuit to protect debtors from 
unscrupulous creditors that would use involuntary bankruptcy 
as a way to force disputed payments is sensible, but distorting 
well-established legal principles is a poor way to achieve it. 
In addition, the Bankruptcy Code also provides other 
avenues that do not depend upon Section 303(b) being 
classified as subject-matter jurisdictional for a debtor to object 
to an involuntary petition that threatens to work an injustice. 
For example, the debtor can request that the bankruptcy court 
abstain from hearing the case on the basis that the parties 
would be better served by non-bankruptcy proceedings.237 
Alternatively, a debtor that has failed to timely object to an 
involuntary petition can move to vacate the order for relief by 
showing that it has “a meritorious defense and that arguably 
one of the four conditions for relief applies—mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”238 In its evaluation 
  
 237 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) (“The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a 
case under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any 
time if . . . the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such 
dismissal or suspension . . . .”). The power to abstain under § 305(a) applies to both 
voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., In re Mountain Dairies, Inc., 372 
B.R. 623, 634-35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Even if [the creditor] were an eligible 
petitioner under 11 U.S.C. § 303, this Court would be compelled to abstain pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 305 because this is essentially a two-party dispute for which the parties 
have adequate remedies in state court. The bankruptcy court is not a collection 
agency.” (internal footnote omitted)); In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A., 303 
B.R. 1, 9 n.11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The legislative history of § 305(a)(1) indicates 
that Congress had in mind a debtor undertaking a voluntary out-of-court restructuring 
and an involuntary case then being ‘commenced by a few recalcitrant creditors to 
provide a basis for future threats to extract full payment. The less expensive out-of-
court workout may better serve the interests of the case.’”) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325 (1977)); In re Spade, 258 B.R. 221, 225-31, 37 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 2001) (discussing the showing necessary for a bankruptcy court to abstain from 
hearing an involuntary case, collecting cases, and concluding that “a court may 
consider any factors it considers to be relevant to the determination of whether a 
dismissal of the case or a suspension of all proceedings would better serve the interests 
of the creditors and the debtor,” including the debtor’s “legitimate interest in avoiding 
the stigma that attaches to those forced into bankruptcy”); In re ABQ-MCP Joint 
Venture, 153 B.R. 338, 342 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993) (“A court may properly abstain from 
hearing an involuntary bankruptcy case which is essentially a two-party dispute, 
where the creditor has adequate state law remedies, and the debtor has no significant 
assets for the bankruptcy court to administer.”); In re G-N Partners, 48 B.R. 459, 461 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (“While there may be other situations in which dismissal under 
§ 305(a) is appropriate, the one most clearly applicable is that in which an out of court 
‘work-out’ has been accomplished or is soon to be accomplished and a few recalcitrant 
creditors have filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition.”).  
 238 In re Hutter Assocs., Inc., 138 B.R. 512, 516 (W.D. Va. 1992) (emphasis and 
alterations removed); see also In re High Voltage Eng’g Corp., 360 B.R. 369, 381-82 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (discussing Rule 60(b) requirements in the context of a 
bankruptcy case). “[T]here is a strong policy of determining cases on their merits and 
we therefore view defaults with disfavor.” In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 
1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (referring to an involuntary debtor’s Rule 60(b) motion to 
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of a motion to vacate an order for relief, the court may consider 
the existence of meritorious affirmative defenses based on a 
Section 303(b) deficiency.239 Finally, a debtor can object to an 
improper claim using the same defenses that would be 
available in a typical non-bankruptcy action to collect.240 
Consequently, the apparent likelihood that the bankruptcy 
court will disallow a legitimately disputed claim should 
counteract the incentive of creditors to file involuntary 
petitions to coerce the payment of disputed debts. Therefore, 
the Bankruptcy Code already incorporates safeguards to 
ensure that debtors are not improperly subjected to 
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.241  
CONCLUSION 
While involuntary petitions may be a small percentage 
of total bankruptcy cases,242 the proper application of the law is 
of the utmost importance to those against whom an involuntary 
  
vacate a default judgment in a bankruptcy case). As the court in Hutter recognized, 
“Bankruptcy Rules 7055 (‘Default’) and 9024 (‘Relief from Judgment or Order’) make 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) applicable to [an involuntary] case.” 138 B.R. at 516; see also In re 
Paczesny, 282 B.R. 646, 647 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (involuntary relief was entered 
after debtor failed to timely answer, but court subsequently granted debtor’s motion to 
vacate the order for relief); In re Morris, 115 B.R. 752, 754-55 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(vacating order for relief pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a), where the order was 
prematurely entered due to administrative error).  
 239 See Jet Star Enters. Ltd. v. CS Aviation Servs., No. 01 Civ. 6590(DAB), 
2004 WL 350733, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004) (explaining that “the Second Circuit 
requires consideration of [affirmative] defenses when ruling on motions to set aside 
default judgments”) (citing Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 
1993)).  
 240 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (“[I]f [an] objection to a claim is made, the court, after 
notice and a hearing . . . shall allow such claim . . . except to the extent that . . . such 
claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any 
agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent 
or unmatured . . . .”); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 
443, 450 (2007) (“[It is a] settled principle that ‘[c]reditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy 
arise in the first instance from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s 
obligation, subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. . . .’ 
That principle requires bankruptcy courts to consult state law in determining the 
validity of most claims.”) (quoting Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 
(2000)); In re Shaffner, 320 B.R. 870, 876 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) (“Section 502(b)(1) 
permits the objecting party to challenge the validity of the claim for any of the myriad 
reasons that would arise either under the agreement itself (e.g., the amount owed is 
$1,000, not $2,000) or under applicable non-bankruptcy laws (e.g., lack of consideration 
or the statute of frauds).”). 
 241 Additionally, § 303(i) provides that costs and attorney’s fees may be 
awarded to a debtor who succeeds in having the involuntary petition dismissed. 11 
U.S.C. § 303(i)(1). If the petition was filed in bad faith, this provision also allows the 
court to award actual and punitive damages. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2).  
 242 See supra note 5.  
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petition is commenced. The need for uniform application of the 
bankruptcy laws243 suggests that the Second Circuit’s position 
in BDC deserves close scrutiny. Although the Bankruptcy 
Code’s jurisdictional structure and statutory language provide 
sufficient arguments against the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of Section 303(b) as subject-matter 
jurisdictional,244 the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Arbaugh245 provides the proverbial nail in the coffin and 
illustrates the importance of proper statutory construction on a 
scale much larger than just that of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Therefore, it is time for the Second Circuit to confront the 
unworkable precedent that it created in BDC and explicitly 
hold that Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code does not 
pertain to subject matter jurisdiction. 
Rachel Green† 
  
 243 See, e.g., In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Uniformity 
among the circuits is also important in the bankruptcy context.”); Gonzales v. Parks, 
830 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting the importance of “the uniformity of federal 
bankruptcy law, a uniformity required by the Constitution”) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 4); Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The 
Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 573 (1993) (“The 
unavoidable conclusion is that the Court is much more concerned with ensuring 
uniformity in the implementation of federal bankruptcy law than with the content of 
such law.”).  
 244 See supra Part III. 
 245 See supra Part III.A.3. 
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